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1Utrecht University, The Netherlands; 2Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Abstract. Changes in different aspects of euroscepticism developed at different paces and in
varying directions in the regions and countries of the European Union (EU) from 1994 to
2004. Using Eurobarometer data, along with data on country and region characteristics,
information on the positions of the political parties and media attention paid to the EU, it is
tested in detail whether opposite developments in euroscepticism were associated with
opposite developments in influencing contextual characteristics. The authors found that the
Netherlands became systematically more sceptical towards the EU, whereas the opposite
trend was found in Spain. The introduction of the Euro partially explains these divergent
trends, but the direction of this effect varies with countries’ GDP.Changes in media attention
on the EU further explain the changes in the public’s attitude. However, this effect is
contingent upon specific circumstances. Growing media attention increases political euros-
cepticism in countries with a negative EU budget balance, whereas it decreases such scep-
ticism in countries with a positive balance. The effect of left-right ideological placement is
contingent upon the EU budget balance as well. Finally, the effect of education on euros-
cepticism is found to be smaller in countries with a higher GDP.
Introduction
The rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in
the 2005 referenda made apparent that numerous citizens of the old Member
States were hesitant to further European integration. In particular, the big
Dutch ‘nee’ came as a revelation because the Netherlands had always given the
strongest public support for the European Union (EU) and further integration
(Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Deflem & Pampel 1996; Díez Medrano 2003;
Lubbers & Scheepers 2005).The reduction of sovereignty of the nation-state in
deciding on certain policy domains is one of the central controversies of the
European Constitution.Resistance to this process, labelled ‘political euroscep-
ticism’, has received far less scientific attention than ‘instrumental euroscepti-
cism’ (i.e., considering membership of the European Union to bring few
benefits or to be a ‘bad thing’) (Anderson 1998; Anderson & Reichert 1996;
Deflem & Pampel 1996; Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Hooghe & Marks 2005,
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Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Mahler et al. 2000; Marsh 1999; McLaren 2006; Steenber-
gen et al. 2007). Trend research focused, almost exclusively, on instrumental
euroscepticism, for which indicators have been available since the early 1970s
in the Eurobarometer data. These refer to the evaluation of the Union in
economic terms. After the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, other questions,
related to political and cultural dimensions, became more relevant.The Treaty
not only aimed at further economic integration; it also paved the way for
further political integration. Moreover, the ‘European citizen’ was born,
increasing the relevance of the extent to which scepticism towards the EU
was induced by opposition to political integration and questions of (non-)
identification with the EU.The extent to which changes in economic, political
and cultural euroscepticism are affected by the same contextual characteristics
is unknown, however.
Harmsen (2004) andHarmsen and Spiering (2004) focused on the evolution
of the European political debate towards growing critical sentiments in the
1990s.They found this ‘discursive shift’ especially in Germany, the Netherlands
and Ireland (Harmsen & Spiering 2004). To what extent the more recent shift
has been reproduced in public opinion is not clear. Explanatory trend research
is scarce, but Mahler et al. (2000) supplied this up to the mid-1990s.Eichenberg
and Dalton (1993) provided macro-level analyses for the period 1973–1988.
They extended this research by trying to explain the trends in euroscepticism
from 1973 to 2004 – the longest time span so far covered by any study (Eichen-
berg & Dalton 2007). Slomczynski and Shabad (2003) provided an analysis of
changes in Polish public opinion towards EU membership. Ray (2003) studied
the extent to which changes in political party programmes and the salience
attached by the parties to the EU affected the public’s attitude.
Most recently, Steenbergen et al. (2007) extended this line of research with
questions onmass-elite linkage and – aswe defined it here – the development of
instrumental euroscepticism.With this contribution, these lines of research are
broadened by proposing a simultaneous test of different trend explanations and
by testing these explanations for different expressions of euroscepticism –
therewith providing comparisons with the research of Eichenberg and Dalton
(2007).Because these authors showed that after theTreaty of Maastricht, there
had been a notable change in euroscepticism trends, this study focuses on
annual data from 1994 to 2004 on attitudes towards the EU that can be related
to trends in country, as well as regional characteristics. Moreover, with multi-
level analyses, we can answer questions about the changing relevance of
individual-level characteristics for explaining attitudes towards the EU.
In this contribution, two questions will be addressed. First, to what extent
can different aspects of euroscepticism be modelled as trends from 1994 to
2004, and to what extent do these trends vary between countries and regions?
788 marcel lubbers & peer scheepers
© 2010 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2010 (European Consortium for Political Research)
And second, to what extent can changes in the composition of the population,
or changes in the context of people’s living conditions explain these trends?
However, this research will not only focus on this contextual level, it will also
take into account individual-level characteristics that have been found to be
important determinants of euroscepticism.To answer these questions, an over-
view of previously proposed explanations is presented, constituting a more
general synthesis of theoretical insights and empirical findings.
Changes in social composition between regions and countries over time
Trends in euroscepticism can be explained by changes in social composition
with regard to the characteristics that previous research has shown to be related
to euroscepticism. Previous studies (on socio-structural characteristics) reveal
that lower social strata are particularly more eurosceptical (Gabel 1998a;
McLaren 2006). Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) proposed to explain this with
the human capital hypothesis. People experience different costs and benefits
from EU membership and are therefore expected to differ in their attitudes
towards the EU (Gabel & Palmer 1995). More educated and higher occupa-
tional category people are believed to profit more than those in lower social
strata from the free movement of people and goods (Ultee 1989). Since privi-
leged categories have better opportunities to apply their talents in an interna-
tional setting than do lower strata categories, the former are expected to be
more favourable toEuropean integration (Gabel&Palmer 1995) and therefore
less prone to subscribe to euroscepticism.However, there are other reasons for
the eurosceptical sentiments in the lower strata. Recently, it has been stressed
that people of certain social categories fear stronger denationalisation due to
further EU integration (De Master & Le Roy 2000; McLaren 2006) and
therefore support euroscepticism more strongly. It has actually been demon-
strated that national identification as well as perceived threat from immigrants
that both prevail among lower strata are more strongly correlated with euros-
cepticism than other attitudes (De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005; Hooghe &
Marks 2005; Luedtke 2005;McLaren 2006; Lubbers & Scheepers 2007).
Educational and social class composition effects may explain differences in
euroscepticism between countries and regions.The decrease in euroscepticism
over time in certain countries may be due to changes in the educational or
class composition, among which would be increasing numbers of highly edu-
cated and service class people. Our first hypothesis proposes that differences
over time in euroscepticism between countries and regions will be reduced
after controlling for differences in the social structural composition of these
populations.
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Changes over time in left-right placement between regions and countries
Extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing parties have often been the stron-
gest opponents of further EU integration. Euroscepticism was correspond-
ingly often modelled as a curvilinear function of people’s left-right
placement (Steenbergen et al. 2007). The evidence, however, has not been
consistent. We expect that the more people place themselves on the political
right, the more they support European integration (Deflem & Pampel 1996):
right-wing people are more supportive of EU membership and thus are less
supportive of instrumental euroscepticism because they expect profits from
European integration owing to liberal market policies. A curvilinear function
can be expected when the far right opposes such liberal market policies
(Steenbergen et al. 2007; Kitschelt 1995). Yet, others have shown that the
left-wing is less sceptical towards the EU (Ladrech 2000; Tsebelis & Garrett
2000; Hix et al. 2007). Right-wing people would be more likely to fear dena-
tionalisation and consequently would be rather sceptical of transferring deci-
sion making to the EU, as has been shown by Ray (2004) and McLaren
(2006). Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) explain the position of voters by
party-based euroscepticism, which assumes that voters follow clues from
political parties (Hooghe & Marks 2005): left-wing parties promote a social
Europe and take a critical position towards a neo-liberal Europe, whereas
right-wing parties promote an economic Europe and take a critical stance on
the EU’s interference in other domains. Considering these somewhat incon-
sistent findings, we suppose that different aspects of euroscepticism are
related to left-right placement. Overall, political placement composition
effects are expected to cause variation in euroscepticism between countries
and regions.
Changes in economic conditions of countries and regions
The main proposition regarding contextual-level effects on euroscepticism is
that people living in countries that benefit more strongly from European
integration are less eurosceptical (Gabel 1998a; Mahler et al. 2000; McLaren
2006; Lubbers & Scheepers 2007). This proposition was straightforwardly
applied to the EU contribution of each Member State. People in the southern
European countries and Ireland, then, are expected to be the least sceptical,
whereas those in the largest net contributing countries (i.e., Germany, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg) are expected to be the most sceptical. Nego-
tiations between the countries lead to adjustments in the yearly contributions.
Annual reductions of these EU contributions may be ‘sold’ by governments to
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the general public as a financial improvement. It is therefore expected that
changes over time in the net contribution may explain changes in attitudes
towards the EU.
The literature on euroscepticism until now has focused more specifically on
three contextual economic factors: GDP, unemployment and inflation
(Eichenberg & Dalton 1993). In the traditional utilitarian approach (Mahler
et al. 2000: 435), economic difficulties would produce more scepticism ‘as poli-
ticians are blamed for recessions’. As trust in national politics and European
politics are highly correlated, so too the EU, as a political institution, is
expected to be held responsible for worsening economic conditions: slower or
even a negative growth of the national or regional GDP, rising national or
regional unemployment, and larger inflation rates are expected to increase
scepticism towards the EU.
The introduction of the euro in January 2002 led many countries to com-
plain against rising prices. Almost throughout Europe, the increase in food
prices was faster in the year before the introduction of the euro than the
average increase between 1994 and 2004 (Eurostat 2005c). In some countries,
this continued throughout 2002, but at a lower rate.We therefore propose that
the introduction of the euro in general has increased euroscepticism.However,
in richer countries with relatively stable currencies, this effect probably has
been stronger. In these countries, increased fears over economic instability
may have dominated, whereas in poorer countries an opposite process may
have taken place.After the introduction of the euro, people in countries with
higher GDP would have turned more sceptical towards the EU,whereas those
in countries with lower GDP would have turned less sceptical. Hence, an
interaction between the introduction of the euro and the level of the GDP is
expected.
Changes in political climate
National party programmes do not differ strongly with respect to the EU issue.
Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004: 45) describe the lack of choice: ‘[V]oters at all
positions of the left-right scale are offered little choice with respect to EU
integration by their parties in their system.’ Most political parties in the centre
of the left-right spectrum showed their pro-EU position on further integration.
Only those at the extreme ends, the – mostly – smaller parties proclaimedmore
eurosceptical stances (Hooghe 2003; Marks et al. 2006; Steenbergen et al.
2007). However, Steenbergen and Scott (2004) emphasised that, both within
and between countries, variation exists in the salience attributed by the parties
to European integration. Over the 1980s and 1990s, the average salience was
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particularly low in the Netherlands and high in Denmark and Greece. In the
new century, it seems that more parties have adopted eurocritical stances, if
only to take the wind out of the sails of the far right-wing parties. Still, as
European Commissioner Bolkestein once alarmingly observed, there is hardly
a topic where the elite and voters differ so strongly, which makes the issue a
political time bomb, even in national elections (Harmsen 2004). Ray (2003)
showed, indeed, that the position of parties on European integration deter-
mines public opinion on European integration, modelled as variation between
countries. Moreover, he showed that the influence of parties’ stances on inte-
gration is contingent upon the salience parties attach to the subject. The
position and salience of parties on European integration are expected to have
developed at different paces across Europe. Steenbergen et al. (2007) showed
that integration positions of parties affect the aggregated public’s opinion only
for the parties that attach high salience to the issue. It is expected that when
political parties put more emphasis on European integration and take posi-
tions that strongly favour more European integration, the public will be less
eurosceptic, regardless of the aspect of euroscepticism.
Changes in media coverage
Media provide knowledge about the EU (Hoddess 1997; Díez Medrano 2003;
De Vreese 2003; De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2006; Kriesi 2007).According to
Inglehart (1970), more information about the EU makes people better
acquainted with it, and therefore less sceptical. A straightforward hypothesis
would be that the higher the media attention to the EU, the less sceptical
people would be towards the Union and the more they would identify with it.
Yet we hesitate to propose this hypothesis for two reasons. First, more media
attention to the EU is likely to be perceived as growing salience of the Union
in politics. This actual or perceived importance may be accompanied by a
perception of threat to sovereignty of the nation-state, which in turn induces a
sceptical reaction. Second, more media attention provides the opportunity for
more balanced stories, commentaries and more critical news. Díez Medrano
(2003) and Semetko andValkenburg (2000) provide evidence for the existence
of various frames.As discussions in the news focus on problems rather than on
positive events in the Union, it is expected that the higher the media attention
to the EU, the more sceptical people would be towards it. Kriesi (2007) found
differentiated eurosceptical mobilisation in election campaigns across coun-
tries based on the attention the EU received in print media and the extent to
which the topic, historically, has cultural roots (Kriesi 2007; Díez Medrano
2003). Building on these insights, it is expected that more knowledge about the
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EU, channelled through the media, induces country specific effects. In coun-
tries with higher contributions to the EU budget, more media attention will
erode the positive connotation of the EU, and hence increase euroscepticism,
whereas in countries that receive more than they pay, more media attention is
expected to decrease euroscepticism.
Changes in individual-level effects
So far, the focus has been on possible explanations as to why public opinion
has changed over time, and why at the same time, euroscepticism differs
between countries and regions. Previously, Ray (2004) provided evidence for
the proposition that individual-level effects on euroscepticism vary between
countries. Following this research, one may expect the individual-level effects
to vary not only between countries, but also over time.The logic is that groups
react differently depending on their social contexts.The human capital hypoth-
esis (Gabel 1998a) proposes that less educated people are more sceptical
towards the EU. Decreasing economic circumstances are expected to harm
people more severely when their human capital is low. Consequently, when
GDP growth slows down, less educated people are expected to be more
sceptical towards the EU as compared to more educated people. Another
hypothesis to be derived from the utilitarian approach is that the influence of
left-right placement is dependent on the EU budget balance. Right-wing
people are, in terms of economic redistribution, more supportive of the free
market and less supportive of government interventions. Generally, they will
oppose the budgetary programmes of the Union. The difference in euroscep-
ticism between right-wing and left-wing people is expected to increase when
the EU budgetary balance turns negative – in other words, when the country
contributes more than it receives.
Data and measurements
The Eurobarometer surveys provide the measurements for this study.As these
studies are conducted repeatedly, they provide a large dataset, making esti-
mates regarding regional variation possible.We used the Mannheim Euroba-
rometer Trend File 2002 and selected Eurobarometers from 1994 to 2002.
Later, Eurobarometers 58.1 (2002), 59.1 (2003), 60.1 (2003) and 61.0 (2004)
were also used.The data cover 394,823 respondents from the old EUMember
States only. For Austria, Sweden and Finland, the data cover the period from
1995, when these countries joined the EU. (For data documentation, see
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Schmitt & Scholz 2005).The regional level consists mostly of the geographical
units that are defined by Eurostat as NUTS2-level territories. However, for
Germany and the United Kingdom where there were very few respondents at
the lower level, the higher level – NUTS1 – territories were used. For Ireland
and Denmark, no regional breakdown at the NUTS2 level exists. For
Denmark, the Eurobarometer distinguishes four regions. For Ireland, the dis-
tinction is comparable to the NUTS3 administration. We distinguished 156
regions. The smallest number of respondents for the period 1994–2004 is in
Spanish La Rioja (n = 176); and the largest number is in Danish Jylland
(11,557).
Dependent variables
To obtain information on euroscepticism, we followed previous research that
distinguished political and instrumental euroscepticism as well as non-EU
identification (Lubbers & Scheepers 2005; McLaren 2006). Political euroscep-
ticism was constructed from questions concerning policy areas that were avail-
able in 19 of the 25 datasets, used with a measurement in all years under study.
People were first presented with the statement that ‘Some people believe that
certain areas of policy should be decided by the (national) government, while
other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union’.
Next, respondents were asked to judge whether the policies mentioned should
be decided by the national government or jointly with the EU. Previous
research has shown that those policy issues can be subsumed under ‘interna-
tional policy issues’, issues of ‘migration and asylum’ and ‘socio-cultural issues’
(Lubbers & Scheepers 2005).Political euroscepticism is constructed as the sum
of the scores on these three domains.
Instrumental euroscepticism was measured by the question that has been
used most often in research on this topic: ‘Generally speaking, do you think
that (our country’s) membership of the European Union is (1) a good thing (2)
a bad thing (3) neither good nor bad?’ The question of whether the respon-
dent’s country has benefited from membership was also included. Both items
are available in all the Eurobarometers under study. The two items correlate
strongly (0.51) and reliability analyses show that the Cronbach’s alpha of 0.67
with two items is satisfactory.
Regarding EU non-identification, we used this question: ‘In the near future,
do you see yourself as (1) nationality only, (2) nationality and European, (3)
European and nationality (4) European.?’ The categories were recoded such
that – in conformity with the euroscepticism measurements – a high score
implies strong non-EU identification. This measurement is available in 15
Eurobarometers and in ten of the 11 years studied. The measurements of
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euroscepticism correlate between 0.20 and 0.30, showing that the measure-
ments refer to different aspects of the EU evaluation. See Appendix 1 for the
correlations for each country, while Appendix 2 presents descriptive statistics
for all variables used in the analyses.
Independent characteristics at the individual level
Education was measured in four categories, one of them being students. The
other three were categorised according to the age at which people have com-
pleted their school careers.Although it is not the ideal measure, this is how it
has been included in the Eurobarometer survey since the 1970s. The first
category refers to people who ceased education at age 15 or younger, the
second to people who did so between ages 16 and 19, and the third category to
people who stopped their educational careers at aged 20 and older. Occupa-
tional categories were pre-coded in the Eurobarometers. In some previous
surveys, more categories were distinguished. Those categories were combined
to make the measurements comparable across the surveys. Farmers were taken
together with fishermen, and small and larger business owners were also
subsumed into one category. People currently not working were categorised
according to their last occupation. People who never had a job were taken as
a separate category. Age also was pre-coded into six categories: 15–24 years;
25–34 years; 35–44 years; 45–54 years; 55–64 years; and 65 years and older.
Gender was included, and women were the reference category. Left-right
placement refers to a scale running from extreme left (1) to extreme right (10).
Contextual characteristics
Economic indicators of GDP, unemployment and inflation were taken from
Eurostat. Gross domestic product at market prices was taken in Euros per
capita at constant prices and exchange rates of 1995 (Eurostat 2005a). Lux-
embourg scores the highest, and its 1994 level was not exceeded by any country
until 2004. GDP was lowest in Portugal in 1994. The annual change in GDP is
expressed as percentage change. The largest growth of GDP was found in
‘Europe’s tiger’, Ireland, with a growth of over 10 per cent in 1997 and 1999.
Next to Ireland, there has been sporadic growth of over 5 per cent only in
Finland, Portugal and Luxembourg. The annual national unemployment level
was derived from the harmonised unemployment statistics based on the EU
Labour Survey (Eurostat 2005b). Changes in the Unemployment level reflect
annual changes in the percentage of unemployed people. The lowest level of
unemployment was in Luxembourg (2.0 per cent) and the Netherlands (2.1 per
cent) – both in 2001. The highest unemployment level was in Spain (19.8 per
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cent) in 1994, which was preceded by the largest growth in unemployment in
the EU. Inflation figures were also derived from Eurostat and refer to annual
figures from the harmonised indices of consumer prices (Eurostat 2005c). The
presence or absence of the euro is a dummy, where 1 was scored for the
countries that introduced the currency in January 2002.
We used expert survey data collected for the purpose of comparing
parties’ positions on European integration. Marks and Steenbergen (1999)
conducted an expert survey asking for the position on the topic of European
integration and the salience in 1999 for each party. They added their data to
those of earlier expert surveys by Ray (1999), who conducted these surveys
since 1984 onwards, from which we use the results of the surveys in 1994 and
1996. The Chapel Hill Party Dataset updated this for 2002 (Edwards et al.
2002). Two indicators measured political climate: the average stances adopted
by political parties on European integration and the salience they attached to
this subject. The first indicator was obtained by asking experts to rate the
‘overall orientation of the party leadership towards European Integration’.
The salience of European integration was assessed by asking the experts ‘the
relative importance of the issue of European integration in the party’s public
stance’. Both measurements were multiplied by the percentage of votes the
party received, thus obtaining a weighted index in which the larger parties
had a bigger influence on the country’s political climate. We assigned the
expert data scores from 1992 to the year 1994, and those from 1996 to the
years 1995–1997; we assigned expert data scores from 1999 to the years 1998–
2000, and the party position data from 2002 to the years 2001–2004.1 The
measurements show that the position on European integration turned some-
what more sceptical across Europe, and that the salience of the topic
decreased slightly.
As for media climate, we managed to collect data for a number of countries:
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain
and Great Britain. For Denmark, information was received from the newspa-
per Jyllandsposten directly. For other countries, the LexisNexis search engine
was used (LexisNexis Group 2006).Attention to Europe, measured by count-
ing the words ‘Europe’, the ‘EU’ or ‘European Union’ in newspaper headlines
per year was used as indicator.The number of newspaper sources as well as the
number of years for which electronic archives were available differed between
countries. For each newspaper, we indexed the number of articles, taking 2000
as the reference year (indexed as 100).Among the countries with more news-
papers, the attention to Europe in one newspaper correlated strongly with the
attention to Europe in another newspaper.2 Including this determinant of
euroscepticism implies that the analysis is restricted to a limited dataset relat-
ing only to the countries mentioned.
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Analyses
To estimate the variation between countries and regions over time and
between individuals, we used multi-level modelling. As explained by Duncan
et al. (1996), repeated cross sections can be analysed by building a four-level
model. Individuals (level 1) were interviewed at different time periods (level
2), in different regions (level 3) within different countries (level 4). Contex-
tual characteristics are dependent on time and geographical components. By
introducing these as fixed effects in this multi-level model, the estimated
parameters indicate the extent to which euroscepticism increases when a
certain time/geographical condition changes. Changes in the geographical
(either regional- or country-level) or time-level variation may indicate to
what extent these changes are related to differences between countries or
time points. To estimate specific trends for different countries, the contextual
characteristics with a time component were randomly set over countries. In
this way we could test, for each country, the extent to which specific contex-
tual circumstances go hand-in-hand with increased euroscepticism, and
whether the effects were similar in all countries. All ordinal variables –
including the dependent variables – were standardised to a mean of zero and
a standard deviation of one.
Results
The discussion of results starts with political euroscepticism as the dependent
variable. In model 1 of Table 1, only the variance components are given.These
show the extent to which political euroscepticism varies between individuals,
time-points, regions and countries. Most variance exists between individuals.
Between time-points, a reasonable level of variance exists as well, implying
that Europeans have shown changes in their eurosceptic political views
between 1994 and 2004. Between regions – controlling for differences between
countries – evidence is also found for variance in political euroscepticism.
Even though this regional level contributes the least to the variance decom-
position, its inclusion increases model fit significantly. Countries differ strongly
in the extent of their populations’ support for political euroscepticism. The
country level accounts for 8 per cent of the variance in political euroscepticism.
Model 2 includes the estimation of the linear trend in euroscepticism.This
improves the model fit to some extent, and decreases the level 2 variance
parameter – though only slightly – as well. The linear trend is positive
(b = 0.011), implying that between 1994 and 2004 the overall level of political
euroscepticism increased.
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In model 3, we added the individual-level characteristics.With this model,
one can see not only which social categories have the most eurosceptic atti-
tudes, but also to what extent composition effects exist. Controlling for com-
position does not, however, decrease the variance in euroscepticism on higher
levels. At the country level, variance even increases somewhat, implying a
reverse composition effect.
A look at the parameters shows that less educated people are significantly
more politically eurosceptical than the more educated, as found previously.
Occupational categories differ from each other in such a way that higher status
groups are less eurosceptical than lower status groups. Unskilled manual
workers deviate most strongly from the higher professionals. Remarkably,
farmers and fishermen – who rely strongly on EU subsidies – are more euro-
sceptical politically as well. Older people are also more eurosceptical. The
significant quadratic term for age indicates that a curvilinear function of age
fits the data better than does the linear one, indicating that after a certain age
the level of political euroscepticism increases even more strongly. Next, men
are less eurosceptical than women. Political euroscepticism was modelled as a
curvilinear function of left-right placement,with people of both the far left and
the far right being more eurosceptical, and people with an average position (on
this z-scored variable) being the least eurosceptical.
In model 4 we present the extent to which the trend in political euroscep-
ticism varies between countries and regions. Model fit increases significantly
with the trend slope allowed to vary.This implies that, both between countries
and between regions, the trend in political euroscepticism varies. These find-
ings are consistent with our expectation that, when controlling for differences
in social composition and left-right placement, differences do exist between
time periods in political euroscepticism,which can partly be modelled as linear
trends. The estimated country effects presented in Table 2a show in which
countries a positive or negative trend parameter was found. It can be seen that
in eight countries, the linear trend effect deviates significantly from the overall
estimated trend. For the Netherlands, the trend parameter is the most positive,
implying that this country has the strongest trend towards more political
euroscepticism. A stronger than average positive trend (meaning increased
euroscepticism) is also found in Germany and Luxembourg. For two countries
– Spain and Greece – a significant deviation from the general trend parameter
was found, indicating decreasing political euroscepticism between 1994 and
2004. For Ireland, the trend parameter deviates significantly from the general
trend as well, but the estimated trend effect is close to zero, implying stability
in political euroscepticism between 1994 and 2004.
We also find differences between regions, both in the deviance from the
country-level estimated intercept in euroscepticism and in the pace with which
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the attitude has changed. The variance parameters are rather small though,
indicating that at the regional level variance is much smaller than at the
country level. Only in a few regions is the trend markedly different from the
national trend.The general Greek trend, showing overtime decreases in euro-
scepticism is less strong in Dytiki Macedonia, but stronger in Thessalia. The
Luxembourg trend, showing increases over time in euroscepticism, is stronger
in the Northern region of this small country. Finally, the Spanish trend towards
less euroscepticism is most pronounced in the region of Castilla-La Mancha.
The effect of low education in that less educated people are more euroscep-
tical politically as compared to the most educated (indicated by the parameter
b = 0.133) generally holds for all countries exceptLuxembourg,where the effect
is non-significant. The eurosceptic attitudes of the less educated and the more
educated are also more similar to each other in the Netherlands,Germany and
Italy because the effect of education is significantly smaller in these countries
than on average in theEU.More pronounced educational differences are found
in Great Britain, Portugal,Austria, Finland and Northern Ireland.The effect of
educationhas decreased somewhat over time,but the effect of the average trend
over countries is not significant. The differences between the less and more
educated increased (a positive interaction effect) in Denmark and Finland, but
decreased significantly in Belgium, Greece and Italy between 1994 and 2004.
Table 2b depicts how the effects of left-right placement (and its quadratic
term) differ between the countries of the EU.The effect of left-right placement
varies strongly between countries in predicting political euroscepticism.
Whereas a curvilinear function best predicts political euroscepticism in general
(indicating that people in the centre are least eurosceptical and people on the
far right are somewhat more eurosceptical than those on the far left), the
relation is linear rather than curvilinear in Germany,Great Britain and France:
the further people are to the right, themore politically eurosceptical they are. In
Denmark,Sweden andGreece, however, the curvilinear relation is much stron-
ger than in theEUon average.Moreover, in these countries far left-wing people
are politically more eurosceptical than the far right-wing people. We also
estimated the extent to which trends exist in the changes over time in the effect
of left-right voting on political euroscepticism.Although there is a small trend
showing that right-wing people have become more eurosceptical in recent
years, the trend is non-significant.Moreover, no significant country trends were
found in the effect of left-right placement on political euroscepticism.
Contextual-level effects
Having found differences between countries in trends and changes in the
effects of education and left-right placement, hypothesised interpretations of
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these changes are presented next. Table 3 shows the relationship between the
contextual characteristics and political euroscepticism and the extent to which
this relationship holds for the trends in these characteristics in each country.
All parameters presented in Table 3 are controlled for the individual charac-
teristics presented in Table 1. Only those parameters that deviate significantly
from the EU average are presented in the table.
Overall and belying expectations, the unemployment level turns out to be
negatively related to political euroscepticism. The higher the level of unem-
ployment in a country, the lower is the level of political euroscepticism. One
might interpret this effect as indicating that people are less sceptical towards a
supranational institution when the country is economically less successful.
However, this effect is zero in Ireland and positive in Greece and Spain – the
three strongest net beneficiaries of the EU. The effect of unemployment is
Table 2b. Estimated left-right placement effects and trends in these effects on political


















General EU effect 0.026** 0.017**
Austria 0.032 0.012
Belgium 0.035 0.012
Denmark -0.090 ** 0.039 **
Finland 0.023 0.008
France 0.060 ** 0.021
Germany 0.071 ** 0.013
Great Britain 0.120 ** 0.008 *




The Netherlands 0.030 0.021
Northern Ireland 0.009 -0.000 **
Portugal 0.033 0.024
Spain 0.030 0.022
Sweden -0.096 ** 0.009
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
Source: Eurobarometer (1994–2004).
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more strongly negative in the Netherlands than on average in the EU.At the
same time, the increase in the unemployment level in the Netherlands is
positively related to political euroscepticism.3 Overall, changes in unemploy-
ment rates are not related to changes in political euroscepticism. A similar
conclusion holds for inflation levels as well.
By comparing the log likelihood statistics at the bottom of Table 3, one can
see that the introduction of the euro itself is one of the strongest contextual
determinants of the level of political euroscepticism. However, in general, the
introduction of the euro seems to have divergent effects. In countries with an
increase in euroscepticism, the introduction of the euro is related to higher
levels of political scepticism – this holds for Germany, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. In Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, the effect of the euro is
negative: euroscepticism is lower in the years the euro is in use.
GDP, over time, is an increasing variable – at least for most years in most
countries. As a result, it largely replaces the trend that existed for years.
Therefore, a better measure of economic climate is the changes in GDP,
which show the relevance of economic growth or recession. However,
overall, there is no significant relation to euroscepticism. The contextual-level
effect from the actual EU budget balance is small and non-significant. It
reaches significance and is in the expected direction only for Spain and the
Netherlands.
Elite opinion and media attention
In the EU, one finds no general significant effect on political euroscepticism,
either from the position that political parties take with regard to European
integration (b = 0.026), or from the salience of the EU issue (b = 0.009). We
did not find an interaction between the two. Again, there are some country-
specific effects. A more pronounced pro-integration stance taken by political
parties is accompanied by lower levels of scepticism in Denmark, the Neth-
erlands and Spain, whereas higher salience from those parties in the latter
two countries went with more scepticism. It was found that salience towards
the issue of the EU decreased scepticism in three countries: Finland,
Germany and Greece.
The media differed strongly in the amount of coverage about the EU. In
most countries, there has been an increase in media reports. Overall, increased
media attention to the topic led to stronger political euroscepticism, and this
was particularly the case in Spain and the Netherlands.Only in Ireland was the
effect reversed because there more attention was accompanied by less political
euroscepticism.
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Various expressions of euroscepticism
The final step of this contribution is to compare the effects of political euros-
cepticism with other measurements of euroscepticism, and for testing (cross-
level) interactions. In Table 4, the parameters of a four-level model of political
euroscepticism, including the individual-level characteristics and the trend
estimates over countries and regions, are compared with the effects on instru-
mental euroscepticism and non-EU identification.The bottom part of the table
presents the parameters of additional models, including interaction effects.
The variance components show that the largest variation over time, control-
ling for the composition and the linear trend, exists for political euroscepticism.
Country-level variation is relatively large for instrumental euroscepticism.The
variances at the regional level – that is, the smallest contributors in the variance
decomposition – aremoreor less comparable among the threemeasurements of
euroscepticism.A significant linear trend between 1994 and 2004 was found for
bothpolitical euroscepticismandnon-EU identification.For instrumental euro-
scepticism, the linear trend was not significant at the EU level.
The individual-level effects are largely comparable between the three
dependent variables. Lower education increases the level of instrumental scep-
ticism and non-EU identification. The differences between the less and more
educated people are greater for these two attitudes than for political euros-
cepticism. For the effect of occupation, a similar conclusion can be drawn. In
particular, manual workers and their supervisors, as well as farmers and fish-
ermen, are more eurosceptic instrumentally, and identify themselves less with
the EU.
The effect of age differs among the three measurements of euroscepticism.
Figure 1 presents the results with z-scores as the function of the measurement
of age (also in z-scores). Political euroscepticism is less widespread among
younger people, but the curvilinear function shows that scepticism increases
among older people.A similar but more pronounced outcome is found regard-
ing non-EU identification. The younger group of the middle-aged shows less
non-EU identification than the youngest respondents (those in their twenties
or younger). Yet among older people, there is a strong increase in non-EU
identification. The opposite relation is found with respect to instrumental
scepticism.The youngest are the most likely to agree with the notion that one’s
country benefits from membership. When people get older, this instrumental
scepticism increases, but the function flattens for the oldest people.
Effects from left-right placement (and its quadratic function) strongly
depend on the kind of euroscepticism.The relationship of left-right placement
to political euroscepticism is U-shaped, with both far left-wing and far right-
wing people being more eurosceptical. Instrumental euroscepticism is stronger
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among left-wing people than right-wing people, whereas the opposite is true
for EU non-identification: the more people are to the right, the greater is this
non-identification.
Finally, we tested for the interactions we formulated in our hypotheses.
Lower education increases scepticism towards the EU, regardless of the kind of
measurement.However,with respect to instrumental euroscepticism, the effect
of education is greater when the increase in GDP per capita is stronger. This
implies that the difference between the least andmost educated in instrumental
euroscepticism is larger in more affluent circumstances than in relatively poor
economic circumstances. This contradicts our expectation that the difference
between the less and the more educated is more pronounced in circumstances
of lower or negative economic growth.The results show a negative effect of the
GDP adjustment among the more educated people, whereas it is close to zero
for the lowest educated.No such interaction effect was observed with regard to
political euroscepticism and EU non-identification. The interaction effect of
left-right placement with EU budget balance is the same for all three distin-
guishedmeasurements. It reveals that euroscepticism among left-wing people is
lower in countrieswith a negativeEUbudget balance,whereas in countrieswith
a positive budget balance, stronger curvilinear relations exist. Generally, far
left-wing people were the most eurosceptic in countries with a positive budget
balance,whereas in countrieswith a negative budget balance,more eurosceptics
were found among the far right-wing people.
Figure 1. Political and instrumental euroscepticism, and non-EU identification as a function
of the Z-score of age (everything else being constant).
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It was expected that the introduction of the euro would increase scepticism
in countries with a higher GDP, and decrease scepticism in countries with
lower GDP.The main effect of the introduction of the euro at the average level
of GDP in the EU is negative. The interaction effect between euro and GDP
is, however, positive in respect of both political and instrumental euroscepti-
cism. In countries with higher GDP (> +1 standard deviation), the effect of the
introduction of the euro is positive. In richer countries, the effect is to increase
euroscepticism, both politically and instrumentally. In poorer countries, a
rather strong negative effect is observed from the introduction of the euro,
implying less scepticism in these countries since the introduction of the euro.
It is argued that amplified media attention increases euroscepticism in
countries that contribute significantly to the EU and decreases euroscepticism
in countries that benefit more from the EU in terms of their EU budget
balance.Evidence for this hypothesis is found only for political euroscepticism.
The overall effect of media attention for countries and periods with an average
EU budget balance is not significant.A positive EU budget balance decreases
the effect of media attention by -0.064. The effect of media attention is hence
negative when the budget balance is more positive. Conversely, a more nega-
tive budget balance (the net-contributing countries) increases the effect of
media attention and the effect becomes strongly positive: the more media
attention the EU receives, the more this generates political scepticism. Inter-
estingly, the effect of media attention is negative on non-EU identification
(and the interaction is non-significant). More media attention towards the EU
decreases non-EU identification.
Conclusions
We distinguished three different attitudes towards the EU and modelled the
changes between 1994 and 2004, between countries and between regions.
Political euroscepticism (opposition to joint supranational EU decision
making) and EU non-identification (feeling a ‘national’ rather than European)
are distinguished from instrumental euroscepticism (considering EUmember-
ship non-beneficial).Particularly, the former twomodes of euroscepticism have
gained more relevance since the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which aimed at
further political European integration and gave birth to European citizenship.
In many countries, a trend towards stronger euroscepticism evolved. The
Dutch have shown the strongest increase in euroscepticism.However, a reverse
trend was found among the Spanish. One of the aims of this study has been to
explain the divergent trends in the EU.Summing up,wemust acknowledge that
many of the changing conditions that were expected to explain different trends
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turned out to be insignificant. Changing levels of unemployment, inflation and
economic growth are hardly related to trends in euroscepticism. In previous
research these parameters were successful in explaining cross-national varia-
tion in euroscepticism, but they are less successful in a dynamic perspective. In
only a few countries are changes in the economic contextual indicators related
to changes in euroscepticism. More systematic support is found for the diver-
gent effects of the introduction of the euro.Based on the cost/benefit approach,
we found evidence that the introduction of the euro has increased levels of
euroscepticism, particularly in countries with a higher GDP,whereas the intro-
duction of the new currency has reduced levels of euroscepticism in countries
with a lower GDP.This, however, might represent a short-term effect.
We also focused on the role of political parties in explaining euroscepti-
cism. From a dynamic trend approach, we found that stances adopted by
political parties and political euroscepticism were related only to a limited
extent.We found people to be less eurosceptic when political parties favoured
EU membership only in Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands. Also, the
salience attached to the issues of EU integration by political parties is associ-
ated with lower levels of scepticism only in certain countries. The results
contradict recent findings from De Vries and Edwards (2009), who do find
political climate effects, however, only tested with cross-national analyses
rather than with longitudinal analyses.We were not able to substantiate or to
replicate these previous findings. In the longitudinal study of Steenbergen
et al. (2007) an interaction was found between parties’ positions and salience.
We could not replicate this finding when using a non-aggregated design and a
shorter time span.We consider it to be relevant to find out which contextual-
level effects account for cross-national differences in euroscepticism and which
would also account for changes in euroscepticism over time.
Media coverage – the main source of information for people about the EU
– has risen in most countries.We found that increased media attention to the
EU has increased political euroscepticism, particularly in countries with a
negative EU budget balance, whereas it has decreased scepticism in countries
with a positive budget balance. These inferences are based on counting the
number of articles that appeared on this topic in nine countries.Recently,more
and more daily newspapers opened their archives online, offering an interest-
ing approach for the study of cross-national differences, as demonstrated by
the in-depth studies in some countries by Díez Medrano (2003) and DeVreese
and Boomgaarden (2006).
Although these cross-national, cross-regional and ‘over time’ differences in
euroscepticism often attract more societal interest, we emphasise that, just as
in previous studies, more variance in euroscepticism is to be found and
explained at the individual level. We found, again, that people (supposedly)
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benefiting strongly from the EU are less eurosceptical, irrespective of the
measure of euroscepticism, supporting the human capital approach (Eichen-
berg & Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998a): less educated rather than more educated
people express their euroscepticism.This effect of education changed in some
countries between 1994 and 2004, but it has not moved in the same direction.
These differences suggest that the effect of education is contingent upon the
(changing) circumstances in which people live. The effect of change in GDP
appeared significant for the more educated people but not for the less
educated, refuting the common belief that people with less human capital, in
particular, would react to changing economic circumstances.
The impact of left-right placement in explaining attitudes towards the
Union is contingent upon context as well. For each of the three euroscepticism
attitudes, we found that the effect of left-right placement is positive when
countries contribute more than they receive, implying that in these countries
people on the right express their euroscepticism more strongly; however, the
effect of left-right placement is more U-shaped when the EU budget balance
is strongly positive, implying that in these countries both people on the (far)
left and right express their euroscepticism.
This contribution provides evidence of divergent trends in euroscepticism.
These trends are difficult to explain. We proposed general as well as (cross-
level) interaction hypotheses. We think that this is a fruitful way to get more
insight into different changes that occurred – and will occur – in the countries
of the EU. Although changes in European identity are quite modest, the
attention to national identity explanations – both at the individual and con-
textual levels (Lubbers & Scheepers 2007) – is quite promising. Previous
studies stressed the importance of threats to national identity in explaining
euroscepticism (Díez Medrano 2003; De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005;
McLaren 2006; Hooghe 2007; Lubbers 2008). This contribution demonstrates
that there is ample scope for explaining over-time changes in euroscepticism
based on non-economic and non-political explanations.
Appendix 1. Correlations between measurements of euroscepticism











EU 0.22 0.24 0.25
Austria 0.23 0.24 0.29
Belgium 0.17 0.19 0.23
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Denmark 0.31 (hi) 0.27 (hi) 0.27
Finland 0.19 0.20 0.28
France 0.22 0.26 0.30
Germany 0.20 0.21 0.27
Great
Britain
0.29 0.29 0.32 (hi)
Greece 0.16 0.15 (lo) 0.19
Ireland 0.14 0.17 0.13
Italy 0.15 0.18 0.26







Portugal 0.17 0.19 0.21
Spain 0.20 0.21 0.22
Sweden 0.24 0.21 0.28
Note: All correlations are significant at p < 0.001.









higher professional 0–1 0.02
employed professional 0–1 0.02
manager 0–1 0.02
middle manager 0–1 0.10
desk employee 0–1 0.12
service employee 0–1 0.11
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Appendix 2. Continued.
Range Mean
travel employee 0–1 0.04
shop owner 0–1 0.08
supervisor 0–1 0.02
skilled manual 0–1 0.16
unskilled manual 0–1 0.12
farmer or fisherman 0–1 0.03
never worked 0–1 0.17
Age 1–6 3.41
Men 0–1 0.48






Euro introduced 0–1 0.16
GDP 7.9–48.0 20.61
Change in GDP -1.2–10.8 3.02
EU budget balance -1.9–0.8 -0.07
Parties’ positions on EU
integration
3.9–6.4 5.34
Parties’ salience of EU
integration
2.3–4.0 3.19
Media attention to EU 55.4–191.3 98.51
Notes
1. In the expert datasets, the sum of votes the parties received did not reach 100 per cent
in all countries, implying that not all minor parties were included in the data. Although
in most countries the sum was over 95 per cent, in France it was particularly lower
(around 86 per cent). The computations were adjusted – based on the percentages the
parties received – such that in each country the sum of percentages was equal to 100
per cent.
2. For Belgium, only Flemish newspapers were used (De Standaard, Het Nieuwsblad and de
Tijd) for information from 1998 to 2004. For Denmark, information from 1997 to 2004 was
received from the Yyllandsposten. For France, the average for the trend from 1997 was
obtained from Le Figaro and Libération. For Germany, information from 1994 onwards
was obtained from the Frankfurter Allgemeiner,Süddeutsche Zeitung,Welt am Sontag,Taz
Tagezeitung and Der Spiegel. For Ireland, the archives of the Irish Times, have been the
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source for data from 1994 to 2004. For Italy, the only information is from the daily La
Stampa, also since 1994. For the Netherlands, five sources were made use of in computing
the average since 1994: De Volkskrant, De Telegraaf, Algemeen Dagblad, Trouw and
NRC-Handelsblad. For Spain, information is available from El Pais, but only for the
period 1999 to 2004. For the United Kingdom, The Times, The Guardian and The Sun
were referred to for information from 1994 onwards.
3. Changes within the Netherlands are stronger than those in other countries; therefore, a
significant effect is more easily reached within the Netherlands than in other countries
where there is hardly anything to explain as the level of euroscepticism has been fairly
stable between 1994 and 2004.
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